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Barrows: Negligence as a Standard of Recovery in Libel Actions in Texas.

NEGLIGENCE AS A STANDARD OF RECOVERY
IN LIBEL ACTIONS. IN.TEXAS
SUZIE BARROWS
In 1974 the United States Supreme Court held in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.' that states may decide for themselves the appropriate standard of liability to be applied to a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory falsehood2
injurious to a private individual, so long as they do not impose strict liability.
The Court reasoned that this approach provided the most equitable balance
between the states' interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful
injury to reputation and the first amendment protection of the press. 3 By
precluding the states from imposing liability without fault, the effect of the
negligence standard in defamation actions
holding was to sanction a simple
4
brought by private individuals.
In reshaping their laws to comply with the Court's mandate, those states
which have considered the question have taken various approaches in interpreting the requirements and in resolving the issues left open by the Gertz
decision. Texas has only recently attempted to define a standard of fault
for publishers of falsehoods injuring the reputation of private individuals.5 In
addition to examining the present status of libel law in Texas, this comment
will discuss the post-Gertz experience of other states as a means of anticipating the problems to be faced by Texas courts in applying a negligence standard to defamation actions.
DEVELOPMENT OF LIBEL LAW IN TEXAS

Texas has recognized the common law distinction between two varieties
of defamatory language: that which is actionable per se and that which is
not.6 Libel per se occurs where, as a probable result of its publication, a
statement causes injury to a person by fact or presumption of law. 7 The
1. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
2. Id. at 347.
3. Id. at 347-48.

4. Although the majority opinion in Gertz does not specifically require that a negligence standard be applied in such cases, it was assumed by Justice Blackmun in his
concurring opinion that the decision predicates libel actions upon a showing of negligence. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
5. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819-20 (Tex. 1976).
6. Express Pub. Co. v. Wilkins, 218 S.W. 614, 616 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1920, no writ); accord, Arant v. Jaffe, 436 S.W.2d 169, 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1968, no writ) (slander).
7. Rawlins v. McKee, 327 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana-1959 .
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plaintiff must show only that the statement was communicated to a third person who understood its defamatory import." Once this is shown, there is no
need to prove malice on the part of the defendant.9 Nor is there a need
to show actual damage, for this is conclusively presumed by the court. 10
Thus, even if the plaintiff has sustained no actual injury, he may still receive
nominal damages if the statement is libelous on its face." In effect, the common law rules amount to strict liability against the publisher of a statement
shown to be libelous per se.
In libel actions the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to show defamation and prove damages.'

2

He need not show, however, that the statement

is false. There is a legal presumption of falsity, which the defendant may
rebut by proving truth as a defense.' 8 In addition to truth, the common law
recognizes privilege as a defense to libel actions. 14

Statements which are

absolutely privileged are not actionable even though false and published with
malice.'
Use of absolute privilege is largely confined to communications
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Morrison v. Dean, 104 S.W. 505, 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, writ

ref'd); accord, Providence-Washington Ins. Co. v. Owens, 207 S.W. 666, 671 (Tex. Civ,
App.-Fort Worth 1918, no writ) (slander). The statutory definition of libel has somewhat supplanted the common law distinction by allowing actions to be brought on all
defamation which falls within its description, regardless of whether the statement is libelous on its face. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5430 (1958). In effect, any
language which comes within the statutory description is libelous per se. Fessinger v.
El Paso Times, 154 S.W. 1171, 1174 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1913, writ ref'd).
8. Teague Brick & Tile Co. v. Snowden, 440 S.W.2d 419, 422 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ) (letter sent to plaintiff alone not libelous); accord,
Burnaman v. J.C. Penney Co., 181 F. Supp. 633, 636-37 (S.D. Tex. 1960) (slander).
9. Mitchell v. Spradley, 56 S.W. 134, 136 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ); Forke
v. Homann, 39 S.W. 210, 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref'd). In addition to the
common law rule, all libelous publications falling within the statutory definition of libel
are actionable without proof of malice. Gibler v. Houston Post Co., 310 S.W.2d 377,
386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); State Medical Ass'n v. Committee for Chiropractic Educ., 236 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1951, no
writ).
10. Hornby v. Hunter, 385 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1964,
no writ); Davila v. Caller Times Pub. Co., 311 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1958, no writ); accord, Texas Plastics, Inc. v. Roto-Lith, Ltd., 250 F.2d
844, 852 (5th Cir. 1958) (slander).
11. Flournoy v. Story, 37 S.W.2d 272, 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1930, no
writ); accord, Maass v. Sefcik, 138 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940,
no writ) (slander); Anderson v. Alcus, 42 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1931, no writ) (slander).
12. See Comment, Defamation: The Texas Approach, 13 S. TEx. L.J. 159, 168-72
(1971).
13. Coles v. Thompson, 27 S.W. 46, 47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ); accord,
Ledgerwood v. Elliott, 51 S.W. 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ) (slander).
14. Cobb v. Garlington, 193 S.W. 463, 466-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1917,
no writ); accord, McDaniel v. King, 16 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1929, no writ) (slander); Vacicek v. Trojack, 226 S.W. 505, 508 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1920, no writ) (slander).
15. Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 110, 166 S.W.2d 909, 912
(1942); Koehler v. Dubose, 200 S.W. 238, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1918,
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made .in the course of legislative, judicial, and executive affairs. 16 Conditional privilege, on the other hand, has a much broader scope: it applies to
all communications made in good faith on any subject with reference -to which
the author has an interest or.duty to perform, so long as the communication
is made to another person having a similar duty or interest. 17 Where a communication is conditionally privileged, the privilege may be overcome only

by proof of actual or express malice.' 8 Texas further provides by statute that
the conditional privilege defense applies to published accounts of judicial,
legislative, and executive proceedings and public meetings if the. account is
''fair, true, and impartial."' 19 The statutory defense of "fair comment" also
allows comment and criticism of the conduct of persons involved in matters
of public concern if "reasonable and fair."' 20 . This defense applies only to
opinions published without falsity 2' so that, prior to 1964, Texas courts held
22
that a misstatement of fact about public figures was not privileged.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY IN LIBEL ACTIONS

The United States Supreme Court decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan 23 revolutionized libel law as it applies to public officials and launched
a series of decisions expanding the constitutional limitations on recovery in
writ ref'd); Light Pub. Co. v. Huntress, 199 S.W. 1168, 1171 (Tex. CiV. App.-San

Antonio 1918, no writ).
16. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.23, at 427-30 (1956). See
generally Runge v. Franklin, 72 Tex. 585, 589, 10 S.W. 721, 723 (1889); Taber v.
Aransas Harbor Terminal Ry., 219 S.W. 860, 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1920),
rev'd on other grounds, 235 S.W. 841 (1921); Koehler v. Dubose, 200 S.W. 238, 242-43
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, writ ref'd).
17. Browning v. Gomez, 332 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363, 372 (Tex.. Civ. App.-Houston 1959,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cooksey v. McGuire, 146 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex: Civ. App.-Eastland
1940, no writ).
18. Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Pub. Co., 149 Tex. 87, 96, 228 S.W.2d 499, 505
(1950); Cooksey v. McGuire, 146 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. Civ. App.--Eastland 1940,
no. writ); Snider v. Leatherwood, 49 S.W.2d 1107, 1111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1932, writ dism'd); accord, Butler v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d 510,.515
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ dism'd) (slander).
19. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5432, §§ 1-3 (1958); see Denton Pub. Co.
v. Boyd, 460 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Tex. 1970); Walker v. Globe-News Pub. Co., 395 S.W.2d
686, 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Nickson v. Avalanche Journal Pub. Co., 34 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, no writ).
20. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5432, § 4 (1958).
21. Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Pub. Co., 149 Tex. 87, 94-95, 228 S.W.2d 499, 503
(1950); Houston Press Co., v. Smith, 3 S.W.2d' 900, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1928, writ dism'd).
22. Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Pub. Co., 149 Tex. 87, 94-95, 228 S.W.2d 499, 50304 (1950); Bell Pub. Co. v. Garrett Eng'r Co., 141 Tex. 51, 61-64, 170 S.W.2d 197,
204 (1943); Hornby v. Hunter, 385 S.W.2d 473, 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1964, no writ); Davila v. Caller Times Pub. Co., 311 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.
-- San Antonio 1958, no writ).
23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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such actions. In New York Times the Court held that a public official could
not recover for libelous references to his official conduct without proof that
the reference was made with actual malice. 24 Actual malice was defined
as knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard as to whether
or not it was false. 25 In subsequent decisions this privilege was extended
to cover situations involving criminal libel, public figures, and invasions of
privacy. 26 Further, reckless disregard was defined in a later case to preclude
liability unless it could be shown that the defendant had "serious doubts as
to the truth of his statement. ' 27 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 28 the
Supreme Court concluded in a plurality opinion that the New York Times
standard of liability applied in libel actions by private individuals against publishers of defamatory statements relating to matters of public or general
concern. 29
Gertz checked the momentum of prior decisions by rejecting the Rosenbloom approach and allowing the states to choose their own standard 'of
liability in such cases. 80 The states may choose either the New York Times
standard or a less stringent one, so long as strict liability is not imposed.A1
The Gertz decision was probably due in part to the widespread criticism
which had greeted the Rosenbloom requirement that reported events must
be of general or public interest to be privileged. The thrust of this criticism
was that since the media itself decides what is newsworthy, the Rosenbloom
decision makes it the arbiter of its own privilege and gives it unlimited protection.. 2 Gertz, then, provided a better balance between freedom of expression
and individual rights. Consistent adherence to the absolutist view in Rosenbloom that freedom of the press may never be restricted would have been
difficult, and perhaps the Court viewed limitation as the best alternative.2 8
The Texas Response to Gertz
Texas examined the impact of Gertz on state libel law in the recent case
of Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc.34 In that case, Foster, a licensed civil
24. Id. at 279-80.
25. Id. at 280.
26. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (public figures); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (invasion of privacy); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964) (criminal libel).
27. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
28. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
29. Id. at 44.
30. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
31. Id. at 347.
32. See generally Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming
Newsworthiness Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 371, 379-81 (1970);
Wright, Defamation, Privacy and the Public's Right to Know: A National Problem and
a New Approach, 46 TEXAs L. REV. 630, 632 (1968).
33. See Note, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 126, 136 (1975).
34. 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976). Garza v. San Antonio Light, 531 S.W.2d
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engineer acting as a consultant to Webb County in a project investigating a
flooding problem, brought a libel action against the Laredo Times. The
Times printed an article erroneously stating the flooded area was platted by
Foster, using language implying that he was guilty of unethical conduct in
performing services for the county.8 5 The San Antonio Court of Civil
Appeals affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant on grounds thatFoster fell within the definition of a public figure and had failed to prove
that the article was published with malice.8 6 On appeal the Texas Supreme
Court held that no evidence existed establishing that Foster was either a public figure or public official and considered instead his right of recovery as a
private individual.3 7 Recognizing its options under the Gertz decision, the
court declined to extend to private individuals the New York Times standard
of recovery requiring proof of actual malice, and adopted the less strict-negligence standard.38 Therefore, under the rule articulated in Foster, if a private
individual proves that a publisher or broadcaster knew or should have known
that a defamatory statement was false, he. may recover for actual injury
caused by the publication of the statement.5 9
DEFINING A STANDARD OF FAULT IN LIBEL ACTIONS

Having opened the door to the implementation of a negligence standard
in defamation actions brought by private individuals, Texas courts will now
be faced with numerous questions concerning the application of the standard.
As a result of the decision in Foster, the common law rules of strict liability
that previously governed libel actions brought by private individuals will no
longer be applicable in many situations. 40 Most notably, a private individual
bringing suit against a publisher or broadcaster on a publication defamatory
on its face may no longer rely on presumptions of malice and general dam926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) was a libel action
brought by private persons. Because the plaintiffs failed to show actual damage, however, the Court of Appeals was not given the opportunity to decide whether the Rosenbloom standard should be replaced by a fault standard. Id. at 930.
35. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976). The article
stated that Foster "doubled" as a consultant engineer for the county. Id. at 811.
36. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975), rev'd, 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976).

37.
38.
39.
40.

Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 817-18 (Tex. 1976).
Id. at 819-20.
Id. at 819-20.
Inapplicability of the old rules of strict liability in libel actions brought by pri-

vate individuals has already been recognized by several state courts adopting a negligence
standard pursuant to Gertz. See, e.g., Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co., 531 P.2d 76, 83 (Kan.
1975); Wilson v. Capital City Press, 315 So. 2d 393, 397 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Thomas

H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 334 N.E.2d 494, 498 (Ohio Ct.- App.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975).
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ages. 41 Gertz expressly precludes recovery of presumed damages in such
actions where malice is not proved. 42 If a plaintiff cannot show actual injury
therefore, he is no longer able to vindicate his name by receiving presumed
nominal damages and a judgment in his favor. 48 A prima facie case of libel
may no longer be made by merely showing the defendant communicated a
false defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff. A plaintiff must now
prove the statement was false, that it actually injured him, and some degree
of fault on the part of the defendant amounting at least to simple negli44
gence.

Since Foster limits the application of the negligence standard to actions
brought by private individuals against publishers and broadcasters, it seems
likely that the common law rules of strict liability will continue to be used

in actions against nonmedia defendants. 45 As a result, libel law in Texas
will consist of one standard for public officials and public figures (the:NewO
York Times rule), a negligence standard for private plaintiffs against media
defendants, and yet another standard based on common law principles 'for
purely private defamation.4 6
Determining the Status of the Plaintiff

Because use of a negligence standard is limited to actions brought by
private individuals, the precise scope of the public figure classification'
41. See Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54

TExAs

L.

REV.

1221,

1235-36 (1976); Comment, Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch,

Inc.: The Impact on State Law and.the First Amendment, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 960,
975-77 (1975); Note, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 450, 466 (1975).
42. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
43. See Comment, Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.:
The Impact on State Law and the First Amendment, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 960, 975-77
(1975). The Court's definition of "actual injury," however, includes such inherently
subjective factors as "impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering," as well as out-of-pocket loss. Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
44. See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEXAS L.. REV. 422, 423
(1975); Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TExAs L. REV. 1221, 1235

(1976).

45. The weight of comment favors the view that the standard of liability proposed
in Gertz was meant to apply only to defamation by the media. See Brosnahan, From,
Times v. Sullivan to.Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First
Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 792-93 (1975); Nimmer, Introduction-ls Freedom
of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, .26 HASTINGS
L.J. 639, 648-50 (1975); Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise
of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TExAs L. REV. 199, 215-17 (1976); Comment,.As
Times Goes By: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Its Effect on California Defamation
Law, 6 PAC. L.J. 565, 578-80 (1975).

46. Cf. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688 (Md. Ct. App. 1976). The court
in that case sought to avoid such complexity in state libel law by holding its negligence
standard applicable to all defendants in actions brought by private individuals. Id. at
696.
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becomes crucial. The Court in Gertz made significant changes in this area
by rejecting the Rosenbloom rule that one who is involved in an event of
public or general concern is a public figure. 47 Under that theory, the media
had almost unlimited freedom to defame, for an individual became a public
figure whenever a comment about him involved a subject of general interest. 48 Gertz narrowed the class of public figures by placing them in two general categories: those who achieve such general notoriety that they become
public figures for all purposes, and those who voluntarily thrust themselves
into a particular controversy and become public figures with respect to that
issue. 49 This second category will most often concern the courts since Gertz
offers no indication as to the extent an individual may participate in a controversy without becoming a public figure. The Supreme Court, however, has
held that the term "public controversy" as used in Gertz does not encompass
"'all controversies of interest to the public." 50 Divorce proceedings of very,
wealthy individuals, for example, do not qualify as a public controversy. 5 1
The greater part of the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Foster dealt with
the threshold problem of identifying public figures. The court observed that
Foster did not assume a special prominence in the resolution of the flooding
controversy, but remained strictly within his role as consultant. Further, he
did not attempt to influence the outcome of the dispute through exposure of
his personal opinions to the public. 52 Because Foster's participation in the
controversy was minimal, the court held that he had not thrust himself into
the controversy in such a manner as to incur public figure status.55 A significant number of other post-Gertz cases, in conferring public figure status, have
emphasized the plaintiff's attempts to promote his views in connection with
a public controversy. 54 As reasoning for its decision, the Gertz court argued
47. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).

48. See Beytagh, Privacy and a Free Press: A Contemporary Conflict in Values, 20
N.Y.L.F. 453, 467-68 (1975); Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RuT.-CAM. L.J.
471, 478 (1975); Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEXAS L. REv. 199, 206 (1976); Note, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 450,

460 (1975).
49. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). Persons who fall into
the first category are generally those whose names have become household words. See,

e.g., Buckley v. Littrell, 539 F.2d 882, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1976) (William F. Buckley, Jr.
held to be a public figure for all purposes); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29, 34

(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 505 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974) (children of convicted treason-conspira-

tors Julius and Ethel Rosenberg given public figure status).
50. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, - U.S. -, -, 96 S. Ct. 958, 965, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154,

163 (1976) (resort to judicial proceedings in order to obtain a divorce decree not voluntary involvement in a controversy).
51. Id. at -, 96 S. Ct. at 965, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 163.
52. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 817 (Tex. 1976).
53. Id. at 817.
54. See, e.g., Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1975)

(college track coach projected himself into racial controversy); Guitar v. Westinghouse
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that those who avoid publicity should be given different treatment than those
who seek it. 5 Thus, it appears that although a plaintiff may find himself
in a position involving a possibility of media exposure, he should not be considered a public figure as long as he does not deliberately attract such
exposure.56

Moreover, once a plaintiff has been given public figure or public official
status, in order for the more strict New York Times standard to apply, a
defamatory statement must relate to his status as such.5 7 This rule was given

support in Foster, where it was held that even though the plaintiff might be
considered a public official by reason of his position as county surveyor, the
New York Times rule would be inapplicable unless the allegedly libelous
article referred to either his official conduct or fitness for that office. 58
Similarly, there is no requirement of malice where a defamatory statement
Concerning a public figure does not refer to his involvement in a matter of
public interest.5 9
Some post-Gertz courts have held that a negligence standard applies
only

to actions brought by private plaintiffs involved in a matter of public interest. 60 Foster, however, seems to apply to all private plantiffs in suits against
publishers or broadcasters, "whether engaged in matters of public concern
or not . ...

61

This approach will eliminate any difficulties which might

Electric Corp.,396 F. Supp. 1042, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (plaintiff was author of controversial book); Carey v. Hume, 390 F. Supp. 1026, 1028 (D.D.C. 1975) (plaintiff
was general counsel to United Mine Workers of America in a controversy concerning
illegal removal of files from union office); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 343 A.2d 251, 258 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (plaintiff's controversial school policies earned him community
notoriety); Exner v. American Medical Ass'n, 529 P.2d 863, 868-70 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974) (plaintiff vigorously involved in fluoridation controversies).
55. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
56. See Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TExAs L. REv. 199, 224 (1976). It has been suggested that
Gertz requires a two-pronged determination before a person can be deemed a public
figure in a controversy: it must first be determined whether the person's involvement
was voluntary, and then the extent of his impact on the controversy must be assessed.
See Note, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 450, 461 (1975).
57. Even in Rosenbloom the Court admitted that some aspects of the lives of the
most public persons fall outside the scope of matters of public concern. Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971).
58. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 814-15 (Tex. 1976).
59. See Douglas v. Janis, 118 Cal. Rptr. 280, 287 (1974) (slander).
60. See, e.g., Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64
(1975); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 546 P.2d 81, 85 (Wash. 1976). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment e, at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 21,
1975) (drafters of Restatement feel there is a possibility the United States Supreme,
Court will limit requirement of fault to statements involving matters of public or
general interest).
61. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. 1976).
Two post-Gertz courts, passing directly on the issue, have held that a negligence standard should not be restricted to the defamation of private persons involved in a matter
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arise where a plaintiff is only a remote participant in an event of public interest or where an article devoted generally to a subject of public concern con62
tains a defamatory statement not germane to the item of interest.
Standard of Care
The negligence standard adopted in Foster requires that the plaintiff show
the defendant knew or had reason to know of the statement's defamatory
potential.63 This approach attempts to fashion a "reasonably prudent editor"
standard similar to the traditional standard used in tort actions based on
negligence.6 4 A negligence standard in libel actions, however, must be more
specifically defined than the common law concepts applied to physical torts
because it involves first amendment protections of the press.6 5 Where injury
to reputation is apparent from the face of the statement or where one had
reason to know of extrinsic facts giving the statement a definite defamatory
potential, that person's failure to inquire into the facts and ascertain their
truth is clearly unreasonable. Where the danger to reputation is not apparent, however, it has been argued that it is not enough for a plaintiff to show
a defendant was negligent in failing to discover the falsity of the statement.
It must also be proved that the defendant was negligent in failing to understand that the statement referred to the plaintiff and posed a threat to his
reputation.66 If neither a defendant's knowledge of the facts nor the nature
of the language used would put a reasonable person under similar circumstances on notice of the need for inquiry, there should be no liability under a
negligence standard.6 7 The common law principles of foreseeability are not
consistent with the Gertz goal of protecting the press so long as reasonable
of public interest. Troman v. Wood, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297 (Ill. 1975) (libel); Jacron
Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688, 690-94 (Md. Ct. App. 1976) (slander).
62. See Troman v. Wood, 340 N.E.2d 292, 298 (Ill. 1975).
63. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. 1976).
This test has also been adopted in several other states. See, e.g., Troman v. Wood,.
340 N.E.2d 292, 298 (I11. 1975); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 546 P.2d 81, 85
(Wash. 1975). The Restatement (Second) of Torts has suggested a standard subjecting
a publisher to liability if he knows a statement is false and defames another, and he acts
negligently or with reckless disregard of these matters. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 580B (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
64. See generally W.

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF

54 (4th ed. 1971).

65. See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53

61 (1975).

TORTS § 32, at 149-

TEXAs

L. REv. 422, 460-

66. See id. at 461-63; Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise
of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEXAS L. REV. 199, 244-45 (1976); Note, 6 Loy.
Cm. L.J. 256, 272-74 (1975).
67. See Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 471, 505-06 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 580B, Comment c, at 28-29 (Tent. Draft no. 21,

1975).
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care is exercised. 8 A defendant should not be given a duty to avoid unforeseen consequences or to ascertain the truth of all statements. To impose
such a duty would approach the strict liability standard specifically rejected
by Gertz.69 Lack of apparent danger to reputation will thus have a bearing
on the determination of whether a defendant exercised reasonable care under
the circumstances.
The law in negligence cases is constructed for the particular case at hand,
with precedent doing little more than marking the outer boundaries of liability. There is a paucity of case law in jurisdictions outside Texas utilizing a
negligence standard in libel actions, and the boundaries of liability are as yet
undefined. One post-Gertz court has found negligence where the defendant
"carelessly distorted the information and magnified the wrong in order to
sensationalize the story; or negligently misinterpreted the information . . .
or negligently used inaccurate language to describe the true facts."' 70 Journalistic negligence was also found in Firestone v. Time, Inc.,71 in which a
libel action was brought against a magazine that had printed an article sensationalizing a divorce case by erroneously stating that one of the grounds
was adultery. The Florida Supreme Court held that the defendant should
have been aware that there was no finding of adultery since the plaintiff was
awarded alimony in the divorce decree and state law prohibited alimony
where adultery was proved. 72 On the other hand, a Louisiana court has
refused to find negligence where the defendant relied on information given
him by the state police without verifying it against local records. 73 Under
such circumstances, it was held the defendant had no reason to doubt the
authenticity of the information and was under no duty to verify it.74 Further
guidance on the question of media negligence in Texas may be obtained from
earlier decisions dealing with the degree of fault necessary to defeat a claim
of conditional privilege. 75 Once standards of conduct are determined for a
68. See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TExAs L. REV. 422, 46465 (1975).
69. See id. at 464-65.
70. Lawlor v. Gallagher Presidents' Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721, 733 (S.D.N.Y.

1975).
71. 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), rev'd, - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 958, 47 L. Ed. 2d
154 (1976).
72. Id. at 178. The case was reversed and remanded for retrial by the United

States Supreme Court because the quoted finding of negligence appeared to have been

made in the first instance by the state supreme court rather than at the trial level.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, - U.S.
96 S.Ct. 958, 969-70, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154, 168
(1976).
73. Wilson v. Capital City Press, 315 So. 2d 393, 398 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
74. Id. at 398.
-,

-,

75. See, e.g., Express Pub. Co. v. Gonzalez, 326 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-

San Antonio 1959, writ dism'd) (newspaper's report that judgment had been entered
against two persons when in reality a nonsuit had been taken against one of them
was unfair statement of facts and sufficient to defeat claim of conditional privilege);
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variety of concrete fact situations, they may be extended to other fact situa-

76
tions, thereby allowing an overall standard to emerge.
Currently, few courts have defined a negligence standard based on the
conduct of the responsible publisher or broadcaster in the community. 7" A
"responsible publisher" standard might favor the more conventional journals
which concentrate on persons who have already attracted press attention and
discriminate against innovative media focusing on private aspects of society,
such as trends, conditions, mores, and lifestyles.7 8 The adoption of any negligence standard, whether based on the conduct of the reasonably prudent man
or the responsible publisher, ought to be particularized. A defendant's conduct should be measured against that of publishers or broadcasters under

similar circumstances and pressures, and with similar resources, philosophies,
79
and goals.
Limitations imposed by Gertz upon the state courts' discretion to compensate private individuals for injury to reputation represent a minimum standard that the courts are required to adopt. 80 The states remain free, however,
to adopt stricter standards. Two courts, fearing a simple negligence standard
would have an adverse effect on freedom of the press, have adhered to the
Rosenbloom rule requiring a showing of malice toward private individuals
where the event is of public concern. 8' New York has adopted an intermedi-

ate standard of gross negligence under which a plaintiff must establish that
a defendant acted in a "grossly irresponsible" manner without consideration
of the standards ordinarily followed by responsible publishers.8 2 A standard
Davila v. Caller Times Pub. Co., 311 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1958, no writ) (confusion by newspaper of criminal's identity is sufficient lack of care
to overcome claim of conditional privilege); Belo & Co. v. Lacy, 111 S.W. 215, 21718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ ref'd) (in absence of notice that they are erroneous,
newspaper reporter is not required to verify official entries on clerk's file docket before
publication).
76. See Note, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 450, 464-65 (1975).
77. See Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co., 531 P.2d 76, 84 (Kan. 1975); Chapadeau v.
Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975). A "responsible publisher"
standard has been specifically rejected by at least one post-Gertz court because it would
make prevailing practices controlling and cause a steady decline in the overall standard
of care observed by the media. Troman v. Wood, 340 N.E.2d 292, 298-99 (Ill.
1975).
: 78. See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 422, 45354 (1975).
79. See id. at 456; Note, TEMP. L.Q. 450, 465 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 580B, Comment f, at 32 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
80. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
81. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450, 457 (Colo. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1976); Aafco Heating & Air Cond. Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580, 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1112
(1976). The Walker case modified the Rosenbloom rule to the extent that "reckless
disregard" in cases concerning private individuals involved in events of public concern
does not require a finding that the defendant had serious doubts about the validity of
the statement. 538 P.2d 450, 457 (Colo. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1976).
82. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975).
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of fault based on gross negligence, however, has not been popular with the
courts. Texas specifically rejected it in Foster, arguing that the difference
between ordinary negligence and gross negligence is not clear and that use
of the latter as a standard of fault would not provide demonstrably greater
protection to the media from self-censorship. 83
Defenses
The adoption of a negligence standard in Texas libel actions will have the
effect of eliminating the common law rule that a defendant must raise the
defense of truth and bear the burden of proving it.s4 There is no longer a
presumption of falsity; since a plaintiff must show a defendant knew or
should have known that a statement was false, he will necessarily have to
prove falsity as well.8 5 Absence of a presumption of falsity may prove to
be more effective than the common law rule since a plaintiff usually has
better access to the information necessary to prove truth or falsity. 86 Although truth is still a complete defense to libel actions,87 the burden of proving it will be shifted to the plaintiff where a negligence standard is employed.
The Foster decision may revitalize the Texas statutory privilege of fair
comment. Because of the broad applicability of the United States Supreme
Court decisions protecting freedom of .the press in libel actions, those decisions
have had the effect of supplanting many common law conditional privileges.88
The Foster decision, however, complies with Gertz by restricting the constitutional protection of the press so that it no longer applies to defamation
by the media of a private individual.8 9 The fair comment privilege, which
protects any reasonable and fair expression of opinion by the media related
to matters of public concern, may be revived as a defense in actions brought
against the media by private individuals involved in public events. 90
83. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. 1976);
see Troman v. Wood, 340 N.E.2d 292, 298 (I1l. 1975) (rejecting a gross negli.
gence standard on grounds that there is little need for distinguishing between degrees
of fault).
84. See General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 352 A.2d 810, 815 (Md. 1976) (slander).
85. See Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 1221,
1235-37 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment i, at 33 (Tent.
Draft No. 21, 1975).
86. See Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 1221,
1236 (1976); Comment, As Time Goes By: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and its Effect
on California Defamation Law, 6 PAC. L.J. 565, 588 (1975).
87. The United States Supreme Court, in a recent case involving invasion of privacy,
affirmed the principle that proof of an article's truth will preclude a finding that the
publisher is at fault. Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 498-500 (1975).
88. See Comment, As Time Goes By: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Its Effect on
CaliforniaDefamation Law, 6 PAC. L.J. 565, 585 (1975).
89. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. 1976).
90. A distinction has been drawn between deductive opinions, which are false assertions of fact deduced from true information, and evaluative opinions, which express a
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. It is unlikely, however, that similar results will be experienced with respect
to other conditional privileges. Under Texas law, conditional privileges can
be lost by a showing of malice, 9x which need be no more than "gross indifference to the rights of others ' 92 or a,"lack of good faith." 93 Proof of fault
under a negligence standard, such as proof that a statement was published
without grounds for believing it true, may amount to the equivalent of an
abuse of privilege and eventually absorb the use of conditional privileges
9 4
altogether.

Should this occur, two problem areas caused by the use of conditional
privileges in Texas may be cleared up. Presently, communications between
employers concerning employees and credit reports are protected by a qualified privilege. 95 Although a defamatory statement may be responsible for
an individual's inability to find proper employment or obtain credit, he does
not have a cause of action against the persons responsible unless he shows
that the statement was made with malice. 96

Neither failure to investigate

falsity nor failure to act with reasonable care has been considered sufficient
to show an abuse of this privilege,9 7 although either might constitute grounds
for a finding of negligence under the Foster rule. It is uncertain, though,
whether the holding in Foster was meant to apply to commercial speech, so
the applicability of a negligence standard in cases involving credit reports or
value judgment based on true information. Deductive opinions alone are actionable,
where fault by the publisher is shown. See Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the
Press, 54 TExAs L. REV. 1221, 1250-54 (1976).

91. Cooksey v. McGuire, 146 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1.940,
no writ); Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Martin, 5 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1928, writ dism'd); accord, Butler v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d
510, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ dism'd) (slander).
92. Buck v. Savage, 323 S.W.2d 363, 373 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); World Oil Co. v. Hicks, 46 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1932,
writ ref'd); Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. McDavid, 157 S.W. 224, 226 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1913, no writ).
93. Cobb v. Garlington, 193 S.W. 463, 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1917,
no writ); accord, Caruth v. Dallas Gas Co., 282 S.W. 334, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1926, no writ) (slander).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment k, at 34-35 (Tent.
Draft No. 21, 1975). But see Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J.
471, 496-98 (1975) (suggesting criteria for the application of a conditional privilege
after Gertz).
95. See Comment, Defamation: The Texas Approach, 13 S. TEx. L.J. 159, 184-92
(1971).
96. See id. at 185. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970), has
helped to raise the standard of care imposed upon credit reporting agencies.
97. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. O'Neill, 456 S.W.2d 896, 900-01 (Tex. 1970); Butler v.
Central Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d 510, 515-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ
dism'd). See Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 471, 492 (arguing
that Texas adheres to strict view of degree of culpability necessary to overcome conditional privilege in credit reporting).
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communications between employers will depend on the position taken by
Texas courts regarding the liability of nonmedia defendants. 98
CONCLUSION

The greatest danger in applying a negligence standard to libel actions lies
in its flexibility, for it vests great discretion in the jury in deciding whether
or not a defendant is at fault. Much concern has been expressed that emotional issues may cause a jury to abandon its discretion and render excessive
verdicts against defendants exhibiting unpopular views, resulting in self-censorship by the media and an avoidance of controversial issues. 99 Such
fears seem to be without a substantial empirical basis.100 Nothing in the
resolution of the Foster decision, or other decisions adopting a negligence
standard, should intimidate responsible publishers and broadcasters. Restrictions now placed on the earlier protections of the press are minimal.
Although private plaintiffs ate, afforded a less stringent standard of recoverr,
they are infrequently the subject of media attention. Furthermore, the'
negligence standard of recovery is accompanied by measures designed to
eliminate the dangers of excessive verdicts against unpopular defendants:
There can be no presumed or punitive damages where malice is not shown,
and recovery is restricted to actual injury proved by competent evidence.' 0 '
It is undeniable, however, that a threat of self-censorship still exists. Yet
some self-censorship is good where it suppresses material of dubious informational value or material which appeals solely to prurient curiosity. If negligence standards are properly applied, publishers and broadcasters will not be
held liable for mistakes that could not have been avoided by the exercise
of reasonable care. Discussion may even be stimulated since the fear that
liability will result from good faith mistakes might be reduced. A fault standard should serve to prevent the kind of negligence which ought to be avoided.
If self-censorship results, then, it will be a self-censorship which society can
well afford.
98,

California has held that credit reports fall outside the first amendment protec-

tions set out in Gertz. Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (Ct. App.
1975).
99. See Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue is Control of
Press Power, 54 TExAS L. REv. 271, 274-76 (1976); Note, 51 Cm.-KENr L. REv. 612,
631-32 (1974); Note, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. RV.126, 139 (1975); Note, 48 TEMP. L.Q.
450, 465 (1975). Anxiety over increased self-censorship was a central part of one of
the Gertz dissents. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 366-68 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. See Comment, Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.:
The Impact on State Law and the First Amendment, 69 Nw. U.L. REv.960, 980 (1975).
101. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974).
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